Harlan Ashby vs. Board of Education, South Sanpete School District : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Harlan Ashby vs. Board of Education, South
Sanpete School District : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall C. Allen; Barnes and Allen, LLP; Attorney for Appellant.
J. Clifford Peterson; Assistant Attorney Genenral; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ashby v. Board of Education, No. 20050658 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5935
NM1M0658-CA 
IN l l i IMIAH CMIRT OF APPEALS 
MflMllASHBY, 
miitlfllppellant, 
IMS. 
BOARD OF EDUilimiQN. ISDWHH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
DefeiioMttADpellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from an Order grantifij 
Sanpete County, 1ft" WmAM\ 
dismiss of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
Honorable David Mower presiding 
Randall C. Allen 
Barnes & Allen, LLP 
Depot Plaza 
415 N. Main, Suite 303 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Attorney for Appellant 
J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN (8315) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorney for Appellee 
ORAL, ARGUMEMII1MD PUlUlttfiD OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 0 6 2006 
No. 20050658-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HARLAN ASHBY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from an Order granting a motion to dismiss of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, the Honorable David Mower presiding 
Randall C. Allen J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN (8315) 
Barnes & Allen, LLP Assistant Attorney General 
Depot Plaza MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
415 N. Main, Suite 303 Utah Attorney General 
Cedar City, UT 84720 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Attorney for Appellant P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorney for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
List of All Parties 
To the best of Defendant's knowledge, all parties to the proceeding appear in the 
caption of this Brief. 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities iii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Issue Presented 2 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 3 
Statement of the Case 4 
1. Nature of the Case 4 
2. Course of the Proceeding Below 4 
3. Disposition Below 6 
Statement of Facts 6 
Evidence presented at trial 6 
Ashby's proffer 8 
Summary of Argument 9 
Argument 10 
Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal because 
that admission negated an essential element of his breach of 
contract claim 10 
Conclusion 15 
Certificate of Service 16 
i 
Addenda: 
Add. 1 (UtahR. Civ. P. 41(b) 
Add. 2 (Complaint) 
ii 
Table of Authorities 
CASES 
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 ) 12 
P.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express. 736 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) 14 
Grossen v. PeWitt. 1999 UT App 167, 982 P.2d 581 2,11,12 
Hambv v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 13 
Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997) 14 
Tuck v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co.. 251 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1958) 14 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) 1 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) 11,14 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) 14 
iii 
No. 20050658-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HARLAN ASHBY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Board of Education, South Sanpete School District ("School District") submits this 
brief in answer to the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Harlan Ashby. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This matter comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) because this is an appeal from a 
judgment of a court of record over which this Court does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. On August 5,2005, the matter was transferred to this Court by the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
R.301. 
Issue Presented 
Ashby sued the School District for breach of contract. Midway through Ashby's 
case in chief, he admitted facts which negated a necessary element of his breach of 
contract claim. The School District moved for dismissal based on Ashby's admission. 
After Ashby proffered no facts that would negate his admission, the district court 
dismissed the case. Was the district court correct? 
A Standard of review 
Whether dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima facie case is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Grossen v. DeWitt 1999 UT App 167, ^ |8, 982 
P.2d 581. However, a trial court's factual findings based either on oral or documentary 
evidence will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at f 5. 
B. Preservation of issue 
The School District raised this issue in an oral motion at the conclusion of Ashby's 
direct examination. Tr. 119. The School District renewed its motion after cross-
examination of Ashby was complete. Tr. 255. The district court addressed this issue 
when it granted the School District's motion and dismissed Ashby's complaint. 
Tr. 280-81; R. 294-98. 
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Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provision is attached as an Addendum to this Brief: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) 
3 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order in a breach of contract case granting a motion 
to dismiss of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David Mower presiding. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff Harlan Ashby brought this action against Defendant Board of Education, 
South Sanpete School District (School District). R. 1-3. Ashby's complaint alleged that 
the School District had breached its employment contract with him when it terminated his 
employment in 1997. R. 1-2. The complaint specifically alleged that his employment 
was terminated based on the false claim that he had misrepresented to the School District 
that he had a master's degree when he only had a bachelor's degree. R. 1-2. The 
complaint also made a claim for attorney's fees associated with the alleged breach of 
contract. R. 2. 
A two-day bench trial was held. R. 263-71. Ashby testified as the first witness. 
Tr. 23.1 At the conclusion of Ashby's direct examination, the School District moved for 
directed verdict.2 Tr. 119. Although Ashby had not finished his case in chief, the School 
District based its motion on the argument that no matter what Ashby's remaining 
Although the two-volume trial transcript is not bates-stamped, the record index 
identifies the transcript as page 306 of the record. See final entry on the Judgment Roll 
and Index attached to the inside front cover of volume one of the record. 
2Although the motion was in substance a motion to dismiss and not a directed 
verdict, this statement of case refers to the motion by the same label as that used by the 
district court and both parties. 
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witnesses said, no evidence could overcome Ashby's admission on direct examination 
that he misrepresented to the School District that he had a master's degree. Tr. 119. 
The court heard argument on the motion and took the motion under advisement. 
Tr. 119-47. 
The School District then cross-examined Ashby. Tr. 147-217. Ashby was briefly 
excused from the witness stand to allow another witness to testify, but then returned and 
completed his testimony on re-direct and re-cross examination. Tr. 219-224; 229-54. 
After Ashby's testimony, the School District renewed its motion for directed verdict. Tr. 
255. Both parties argued the motion for directed verdict. Tr.. 255-72. 
The district court announced its tentative decision to grant the motion, agreeing 
with the School District that no evidence could overcome Ashby's admission. Tr. 275. 
Ashby then raised the issue of a proffer and the district court allowed him to proffer the 
testimony of his other witnesses. Tr. 277-80; R. 294. After considering the proffer, the 
district court stated that its initial ruling would stand because the proffered testimony was 
not enough to overcome Ashby's admission. Tr. 280-81. Finding that Ashby was 
properly discharged for misrepresenting his degree status to the School District, the 
district court concluded that Ashby's breach of contract claim failed. R. 298; Tr. 280-81. 
The court also dismissed the attorney's fees claim because it was a derivative of the 
breach claim. R. 298; Tr. 
A formal order of dismissal was entered June 30,2005. R. 294-98. Ashby filed 
his notice of appeal on July 29,2005. R. 282-83. 
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3. Disposition Below 
By Judgment and Order on Directed Verdict entered June 30,2005, the district 
court granted the School District's motion for directed verdict and dismissed Ashby's 
complaint. R. 294-98. 
Statement of Facts 
The district court based its decision in part on oral and documentary evidence 
presented at trial and in part on Ashby's proffer of evidence. R. 294. 
Evidence presented at trial 
Ashby was hired as a teacher by the School District in 1976. Tr. 26. At that time, 
he had a bachelor's degree and approximately 90 additional credit hours. Tr. 25. Ashby 
was placed in salary lane 3, a lane which was informally called the master's degree lane. 
Tr. 35, 37. 
In 1986, the School District added a fourth salary lane for teachers with a master's 
degree, while lane 3 remained for teachers with a bachelor's degree plus 55 or more 
additional credit hours. Tr. 42; Ex. 7. In December of 1986, in keeping with normal 
practice, the School District sent Ashby two copies of his proposed contract for the 1986-
87 school year. Tr. 179-80. The proposed contract placed Ashby in the newly created 
fourth lane designated for teachers with a master's degree. Ex. 6. With the copies of the 
contract, the School District superintendent also sent Ashby a memorandum, asking 
6 
Ashby to verify the salary lane and amount of the contract and, if correct, sign and return 
one copy to the School District. Ex. 6;3 Tr. 179-81; 183. 
Ashby signed the contract and returned it to the School District without correcting 
the salary lane designation. Ex. 6. Ashby received and signed employment contracts 
with the District for the next nine years, from the 1987-88 school term through the 1995-
96 term, all with the improper lane designation. Ex. 10-19; Tr. 184-85. As a result, 
Ashby was overpaid for nine years.4 
Over the years, Ashby implied to other teachers that he had a master's degree by 
telling them that he "had pursued a Master's Degree at the University of New Mexico." 
Tr. 76. He would, however, tell close friends that he did not have a master's degree, but 
was on Lane 4 for other reasons. Tr. 76. Sometime in 1995 or 1996, a School District 
secretary, Sherry Neeley, requested that Ashby provide the transcripts of his master's 
degree. Tr. 78. Ashby testified that he "panicked" and did not give Neeley an honest 
answer by not correcting the perception that he had a master's degree. Tr. 78. Instead, he 
stated that the information Neeley requested was in his personnel file. Tr. 79. Several 
School District personnel asked Ashby to provide his master's degree transcripts for the 
School District's files. Tr. 78,195-97. At one point, Ashby's principal, in an effort to get 
Ashby's master's degree transcripts, even typed a letter for Ashby requesting his master's 
degree transcripts from the University of New Mexico. Tr. 197. Despite these repeated 
3Because the trial exhibits, which are included in the Supplemental Record, are not 
bates-stamped, this brief cites to them by their original trial exhibit number. Defendant's 
exhibits are numbered 1-48 and 60-62, and Plaintiffs exhibits are numbered 49-59 and 
63-67. A master exhibit list is included at the beginning of the Supplemental Record and 
also appears at R. 268-71. 
4Ashby was not overpaid during the 1986-87 school year because lanes 3 and 4 
were paid identical amounts for the step that Ashby was on. Ex. 7. 
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efforts to obtain Ashby's master's degree documentation, Ashby never stated that he did 
not have a master's degree. Tr. 197. 
Ashby finally admitted to the School District in June or July of 1997 that he did 
not have a master's degree. Tr. 85. On August 13,1997, the School District suspended 
Ashby without pay because of his false claim to have a master's degree and his continual 
misrepresentation when he was asked to produce transcripts showing he had a master's 
degree. Ex. 55. On August 28, 1997, the School District terminated Ashby for cause. 
Ex. 56. One of the four allegations supporting his termination identified in his 
termination notice was "[djishonesty or falsification of any information supplied to the 
school district." Ex. 56. 
Ashby's proffer 
The superintendent had agreed to resolve the issue of Ashby's credentials by 
decreasing his pay to the correct amount but then abandoned the agreement and fired him 
instead. Tr. 278. Other employees found to be on the wrong pay track were not fired. 
Tr. 278. The School District was looking for a way to terminate Ashby's employment 
because of its displeasure with Ashby stemming from an audit two years before he was 
terminated. Tr. 279,280. The School District used Ashby's dishonesty as a pretext for 
firing him. Tr. 279. When Neeley asked Ashby for his credentials, Ashby never directly 
told her that he had a master's degree, even if he may have been equivocal about it, but 
instead directed her to the personnel file. Tr. 280. It was the practice of smaller school 
districts to place teachers on a higher salary lane in order to compete with larger school 
districts. Tr. 280. When Ashby was hired in 1976, the School District was not deceived 
by Ashby about his academic credentials because Ashby truthfully stated that he only had 
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a bachelor's degree and Ashby was told not to tell other employees that he was on a 
higher salary lane. Tr.279,280.5 
Summary of Argument 
Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal of his case because it 
negated an essential element of his breach of contract claim, namely that he was fired 
based on a false allegation that he lied about his credentials. Because this was not a jury 
proceeding, the district court properly weighed Ashby's testimony, ultimately finding that 
his admission defeated his breach of contract claim because it showed that the allegation 
supporting his termination was true, that he had in fact lied about his credentials. 
Because the evidence in Ashby's proffer was irrelevant to his limited claim that his 
termination was based on a false allegation, the district court correctly concluded that 
Ashby could not prevail breach of contract claim even if he were allowed to finish his 
case in chief. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of this 
case. 
Although the dispositive motion here was labeled a motion for directed verdict, it 
was in substance a motion to dismiss since this proceeding was a bench trial. 
Accordingly, the authority pertaining to directed verdict cited by Ashby does not apply. 
This Court should reject Ashby's invitation to weigh anew his trial testimony because the 
5Ashby embellishes his proffer on appeal. He states that the superintendent would 
have testified that one of the real reasons for firing Ashby was that Ashby was sick. Aplt. 
Brf. at 17. But the record reflects that Ashby did not mention sickness in his proffer of 
the superintendent's testimony. Tr. 278-89. 
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findings the district court made with respect to the live testimony it heard are entitled to 
deference on review. Furthermore, Ashby has not challenged the sufficiency of the 
district court's findings or demonstrated that the findings are clearly erroneous; in fact, he 
has argued that the clearly erroneous standard should not apply, based on inapposite 
directed verdict cases. 
Argument 
Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal because it 
negated a necessary element of his breach of contract claim 
The district court correctly determined that Ashby's admission of dishonesty 
warranted dismissal because that admission negated an essential element of his breach of 
contract claim. The complaint only alleged that Ashby's employment was terminated 
based on a false allegation that he had misrepresented to the School District that he had a 
master's degree when he only had a bachelor's degree. R. 1-2. By admitting that he had 
in fact misrepresented his degree status, Ashby negated the essential claim that he was 
terminated based on a false allegation. Because the allegation of dishonesty was not 
false, by Ashby's own admission, the district court correctly concluded that no breach of 
contract occurred. 
Although the district court and both parties characterized the dispositive motion as 
one for directed verdict, the motion was in substance a motion to dismiss under Utah R. 
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Civ. P. 41(b). Grossen v. DeWitt 1999 UT App 167, f7, 982 P.2d 581 (stating that u[i]n 
the context of a bench tr ial . . . the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is a motion to 
dismiss"). This court will review a motion thus mislabeled as a motion to dismiss. Id. at 
Tf8. Accordingly, the argument portion of this brief will refer to the School District's 
motion as a motion to dismiss. Much of the authority cited by Ashby deals with directed 
verdict cases, where the trial court must not invade the jury's role as fact-finder. These 
cases are of little help here where the judge acted as finder of fact. 
The district court's findings that Ashby misrepresented his degree status are 
entitled to a deferential standard on review. Although this Court reviews the legal 
conclusions supporting the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness, the underlying 
findings of fact to which the law is applied are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Grossen. 1999 UT App 167 at %5. This more deferential standard is applied to 
findings of fact that are based on either oral or documentary evidence presented to the 
trial court. Id. Ashby's testimony and numerous documents were presented to the 
district court in its capacity as fact-finder. Ashby testified that he panicked and failed to 
give an honest answer when asked by the School District for his master's degree 
credentials. Tr. 78. Ashby further testified that he implied over the years to other 
teachers that he had a master's degree. Tr. 76. Ashby admitted signing ten successive 
annual contracts without correcting the improper master's degree lane designation on 
each contract. Tr. 184-85. The contracts themselves were admitted into evidence. Ex. 
10-19; Tr. 184-85. And Ashby testified that several School District employees asked him 
for his master's degree transcripts but he never stated that he did not have a master's 
degree. Tr. 78,195-97. In addition to this evidence of Ashby's dishonesty, the district 
court also heard the self-serving portions of Ashby's testimony cited in the opening brief. 
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Nevertheless, as fact-finder, the district court weighed Ashby's credibility and found that 
Ashby was dishonest in representing his degree status to the School District. Because 
Ashby does not properly challenge the sufficiency of this underlying finding, this Court 
should assume that the record supports the finding and review only the accuracy of the 
district court's conclusions of law. Grossen, 982 P.2d 581 at [^10 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (stating that "because appellants do not challenge the court's findings, 
let alone demonstrate they are clearly erroneous, we assume that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court"). 
Ashby now claims that he did not deceive the School District regarding his degree 
status but this argument fails because it is an improper attempt to revisit the district 
court's factual findings without marshaling the evidence. See Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 
82,1f76, 100 P.3d 1177 (stating that in order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact, an 
appellant "must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below") (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). This Court should reject Ashby's argument to the extent it asks this court to 
improperly weigh portions of his testimony against other portions of his testimony. 
Given the district court's finding that Ashby misrepresented his degree status, the 
only legal question before this court, then, is whether the proffered6 evidence overcame 
6Although the district court announced a tentative ruling on the motion to dismiss 
before plaintiff made a proffer of his remaining witnesses, the record is clear that the 
court allowed plaintiff to make a proffer and then considered the proffer before making a 
final ruling, even commenting on specific points raised in the proffer. Tr. 280-81. After 
considering the proffer, the court announced that its tentative ruling would stand because 
nothing in the proffer would have overcome Ashby's admission of dishonesty. Tr. 281. 
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Ashby's admission of dishonesty.7 This is a purely legal question since an appellate court 
is in "as good a position to review the proffer as was the trial court, as no assessment of 
witness credibility occurred below." Hambv v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273,278 (Utah 1989). 
Even accepting as true everything in Ashby's proffer, nothing in the proffer is 
relevant to Ashby's claim that his termination was based on the false allegation that he 
misrepresented his credentials. Ashby's honesty with various individuals is irrelevant to 
his signing ten contracts without correcting the improper lane designation. Regardless of 
whether smaller school districts placed teachers on higher salary lanes to compete with 
large school districts, Ashby proffered no testimony to establish that the School District 
did in fact intentionally place Ashby on a higher track during the 1986-87 term or the 
following nine school years for that reason. And even if Ashby would have been able to 
prove that the School District used his dishonesty as a mere pretext for firing him, he 
never explained to the trial court why such proof was relevant to his breach of contract 
claim. Evidence of pretext was irrelevant to the only legal theory that Ashby pled or 
clearly articulated below — that is, that the School District breached his employment 
contract by terminating based on the false allegation that he misrepresented his 
credentials. Nor has he provided any such explanation in his opening brief on this appeal. 
Because Ashby's proffer thus had no relevance to his narrow claim that the School 
District breached his employment contract by firing him based on a false allegation of 
dishonesty, the district court correctly dismissed Ashby's complaint. 
7By Ashby's own admission, the allegation of dishonesty supporting his 
termination was in fact true. Ashby could not have negated his admission of dishonesty 
without impeaching his own testimony, which would also have then called into question 
all of his self-serving testimony, throwing his case into chaos. 
13 
Additionally, although Rule 41(b) contains language suggesting that a motion to 
dismiss would not normally be granted until after plaintiff has concluded his case in 
chief, the obvious futility of Ashby's case weighs heavily in favor of the district court's 
decision to preserve judicial economy by avoiding additional unnecessary time in trial. 
Ashby concedes the general proposition that the language of Rule 41(b) does not 
necessarily preclude a dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case, as long as there is 
good reason. Further, the trend in federal authority supports the district court's decision 
to dismiss Ashby's case when the futility of continuing the trial is apparent. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 41(b) was amended in 1991 to delete the phrase limiting a motion to dismiss to after a 
plaintiff concluded his case in chief. Even before this amendment, several cases illustrate 
the federal trend to allow dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case in situations similar 
to the present case where the futility of continuing with the trial was apparent. A Fourth 
Circuit case affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a case after opening statements when 
plaintiffs opening statement revealed beyond question the absence of a valid claim and 
the futility of a trial. Tuck v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co.. 251 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 
1958). The First Circuit affirmed a dismissal midway through a plaintiffs case in chief 
when it became apparent that the only witness who could establish a material fact did not 
have personal knowledge of that fact. P.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, 736 F.2d 
1 (1st Cir. 1984). Moreover, because Ashby could not have prevailed even if he had 
been allowed to present his evidence as proffered, he suffered no prejudice from the 
district court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss and any error was harmless. Price 
v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251,1255 (Utah 1997). 
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Conclusion 
Ashby's admission of dishonesty warranted dismissal of his case because it 
negated an essential element of his breach of contract claim, namely that he was fired 
based on a false allegation that he misrepresented his credentials. Because this was not a 
jury proceeding, the district court properly weighed Ashby's testimony, ultimately finding 
that his admission defeated his breach of contract claim because it showed that the 
allegation of Ashby's dishonesty was true. Because the evidence in Ashby's proffer was 
irrelevant to his limited claim that he was fired based on a false allegation, the district 
court correctly concluded that Ashby could not prevail breach of contract claim even if he 
were allowed to finish his case in chief. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal of this case. 
^ f e r < Dated this & ~day of April, 2006. 
XIFFORD PETERSEN 
AssistantAttorney General 
Attorney for Board of Education, South 
Sanpete School District 
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Randall C. Allen 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 40 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Note 8 
witness to be present. Lancino v. Smith, 1909, 
36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914. Pretrial Procedure <&=> 
726 
9. Involuntary dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion 
Case was properly dismissed in 1987 for lack 
of prosecution, where plaintiff filed complaint 
in 1980, plaintiff amended his complaint twice 
and tried to amend it a third time, plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment three times, at-
tempted to appeal denial and filed numerous 
motions in an apparent attempt to circumvent 
denial of summary judgment, plaintiff objected 
to all three trial dates set, two of plaintiff's 
three attorneys withdrew from the case because 
plaintiff failed to pay them, plaintiff filed no 
certificate of readiness for trial and took no de-
positions, and defense witnesses became un-
available. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 40(b), 41(b). 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 1989, 779 P.2d 237, cer-
tiorari denied 789 P.2d 33. Pretrial Procedure 
<S=»587 
Where medical malpractice action was filed 
on October IS, 1972, trial date was set for 
October 24, 1974, where on trial date plaintiffs 
counsel moved for continuance after stating that 
person he had hoped would testify was absent, 
#nd where record showed that plaintiff or her 
counsel had been dilatory in responding to ef-
forts of defendant to obtain discovery and had 
resisted defendant's attempts to resolve the is-
sue by getting the case to trial, dismissal for 
failure to prosecute was not an abuse of discre-
tion since plaintiff was not ready to proceed on 
trial date, such failure was the result of inexcus-
able neglect, and no justification for continu-
ance was shown. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule* 40(b), 41(b). Maxfield v. Fishier, 1975, 
538 P2d 1323. Pretrial Procedure<3=>597 
10. Review 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in de-
ciding whether to grant continuances, and their 
decision will not be overturned unless that dis-
cretion has been clearly abused. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 40(b). Brown v. Glover, 2000, 16 
P.3d 540, 408 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2000 UT 89, 
on remand 2000 UT App 52, 2001 WL 298577. 
Appeal And Error <§=> 966(1); Pretrial Procedure 
<3=>7l3 
Reviewing court should not reverse trial 
court's continuance ruling without a showing 
that trial court has abused its discretion. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 40(b). Bairas v. John-
son, 1962, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375. Ap-
peal And Error <&> 966(1) 
Granting or refusing a continuance is discre-
tionary, and will not be reviewed except in 
cases of an abuse of discretion. Sharp v. Ca-
naki* Gianulakis, 1924, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 
337. Appeal And Error <£=> 966(1) 
The denial of a continuance, sought for ab-
sence of witnesses or a party, will not be dis-
turbed, in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
Lancino v. Smith, 1909, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 
914. Appeal And Error <3=> 966(2) 
R U L E 4 1 . DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof* 
(1) By Plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the 
adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under 
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is 
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court 
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same 
claim. 
(2) By Order of Court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be 
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him 
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against 
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
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independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the 
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of 
his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court 
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleadiiig is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the 
trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who has once dis-
missed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for 
the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper 
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with 
the order. 
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to Adverse Party. Should a party 
dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant 
to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such 
party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must 
thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such 
provisional remedy wi s obtained. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.] 
Cross References 
Dismissal of action for review of informal adjudicative proceedings, water and irrigation, see 
§ 73-3-15. 
Library References 
Pretrial Procedure €>501 to 517, 551, 563, 307Ak581; 307Ak690; 307Ak693; 
581, 690, 693. 388k384. 
Trial <s>384 C J .S . Dismissal and Nonsuit §§ 2 to 34, 47 to 
Westlaw Key Number Searches- 307Ak501 to
 4 9 5 1 t o 6 2 > 6 6 t o 67f 6 9 t o 73, 79. 
307Ak517; 307Ak551; 307Ak563; 
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ADDENDUM 2 
r.Lt 
KARL H. MUELLER (8559) SAHP*TC ce••'.* 
THE PARK FIRM, PC 
P.O. Box 2438 2001 P! •": 20 ftPll'J '~ 
St. George, UT 84771 
Telephone: (435) 673-8689 ^VPP t -
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HARLAN ASHBY, 
Plaintiff, ) COMPLAINT 
v. 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH , .
 n. « n - . ^ . , 
SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) Case No. 01 OleOO-yp^ 
Defendants. ) Judge \/_. L- fVcAff 
Plaintiff alleges: 
1. In the year 1976, Harlan Ashby was hired as a teacher by the board of 
education for the South Sanpete School District. He continued in that 
employment through May 28,1997. 
2. On August 13,1997, plaintiff was notified by letter that he was 
suspended without pay beginning August 18,1997 for the specific reason that he 
claimed to have a Masters Degree and continued to misrepresent that fact during 
the years he was employed by the defendant. 
3. The South Sanpete District Service Record states that the plaintiff had a 
B.A. Degree in Archeology and none of the documents submitted by the plaintiff 
state that he has a Masters Degree. 
4. The plaintiff followed the appropriate administrative grievance 
procedure and the school district determined that the grievance policy had been 
met. 
5. The charges against the plaintiff were falsely made and the plaintiffs 
contract with the defendant was terminated based solely on those charges. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
Plaintiff incorporates all of the previous allegations into his first cause of action 
and further alleges as follows: 
6. The actions of the defendant constitute a breach of contract and plaintiff is 
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Attorney's fees) 
Plaintiff incorporates all of the previous allegations into his second cause of 
action and further alleges as follows: 
7. The statements of the defendant made in support of termination were false 
and untrue and are not supported by the documents and plaintiff takes the position 
that the defendant acted in bad faith and that plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, it is the request of the plaintiff that he be entitled to damages 
at an amount to be proven at trial and also be granted attorney's fees in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
DATED this /& ^ day of "^fiush ,2001. 
Karl H?"Mue1ler 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3965 Rome Way 
Apple Valley, UT 84737 
